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ABSTRACT
The Armada Campaign of 1588 has been considered a key moment in Anglo-Spanish 
relations and a considerable amount of literature around the subject has appeared since 
then, particularly in England. It is from the fourth centenary of the battles onwards that 
interpretations started to agree on a defeat for both countries, as against the traditional
stand of a Spanish defeat at the hands of the English. The purpose of this B.A. Thesis is 
to examine which of the two perceptions is implied in such texts as were written in the 
immediate aftermath of the campaign. For such purpose, Petruccio Ubaldino’s 
Discourse concerning the Armada (1590) and Pedro de Ribadeneyra’s Exhortation to 
the Invincible (1588) and Letter to Philip II (1589) will be analysed. The results 
obtained will confirm the idea that both countries were defeated but also prove that the 
myth of the English victory over the Armada could crystallise as early as then due to the 
absolute unexpectedness of the outcome of the conflict.
Keywords: Spanish Armada, Petruccio Ubaldino, Pedro de Ribadeneyra, Anglo-Spanish 
Relations, Myth
La campaña naval de la Armada Invencible ha sido considerada un punto clave en la 
historia de las relaciones anglo-hispanas y desde entonces se ha publicado un buen 
número de publicaciones sobre el tema, especialmente en Inglaterra. Es desde el cuarto 
centenario en adelante que los historiadores empezaron a coincidir en que se trató de
una derrota para ambos países, interpretación contraria a la tradicionalmente sostenida 
de se dio la derrota de España a manos de los ingleses. El propósito de este Trabajo de 
Fin de Grado es examinar si esta idea de derrota de ambos países está implícita en textos 
escritos inmediatamente después de los acontecimientos. A tal fin, hemos seleccionado 
para analizarlos la narración de Petruccio Ubaldino sobre la Armada Invencible (1590)
y la Exhortación a la Invencible (1588) y carta a Felipe II (1589) de Pedro de 
Ribadeneyra. Los resultados obtenidos después de tal análisis confirman que ambos 
países fueron derrotados pero prueban también el mito de la victoria inglesa a costa de 
la Armada pudo cristalizar tan temprano debido a lo absolutamente inesperado que fue 
el resultado del enfrentamiento.
Palabras clave: Armada Invencible, Petruccio Ubaldino, Pedro de Ribadeneyra, 
Relaciones Anglo-Hispanas, Mito.
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1INTRODUCTION
Around 1588, England and Spain were immersed in very different 
circumstances. The former was undergoing a period in which Protestantism was being 
secured by Queen Elizabeth, Catholic persecutions were widespread, and finance was 
short. The latter was living a period in which the empire had reached its peak and Philip 
II was reputed in many regions worldwide for being the most powerful monarch of all 
times. The relation of the two monarchs became subject to deterioration, as did the 
relation between their countries, ever since England had begun assaulting the West 
Indies, supporting the war in Flanders against Spain, and even attacking Spain on
occasions such as the Sack of Cadiz. The Spanish treasury did not see how accounts 
could keep a positive balance.
The King of Spain resolved to send his Armada and invade England. The 
enterprise had been under preparation long before, but with the execution of Mary 
Stuart in 1587, English Catholics were definitely in danger and the honour and respect 
of Spain called into question. From the campaign Philip II expected to obtain another 
lesson of confidence like that of Lepanto; Queen Elizabeth gave hers to her troops at 
Tilbury: “we shall shortly have a famous victory over those enemies of my God, of my 
kingdom, and of my people” (May 77), aware as she surely was of their 
disadvantageous position. Resulting in one of the more spectacular events in the 
century, the outcome of the Armada conflict of 1588 would be equally unexpected for 
both.
1.1 State of the Art
The events of the Armada campaign and its aftermath have been widely studied. 
Comparatively, there are many more English than Spanish studies on the issue, even 
nowadays, and with different conclusions. This may be the reason why the English 
version of events has prevailed over the Spanish one. English authors before 1988, from 
William Camden, through the Whig historians, to D. W. Waters focused on describing 
the victory of their nation at the expense of the Spanish defeat; whereas Spanish 
authors, such as Antonio de Herrera, Carlos Coloma, and Baltasar Porreño among 
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others centered on Philip II and lamenting the dramatic defeat. Moreover, documents 
that were published a century and a half ago by, for example, Laughton and Fernández 
Duro had been recently completed by Jorge Calvar Gross in 2014, which shows how 
very relevant the question is still today.
This idea of an English victory as a result of the naval campaign remained intact 
well into the mid-twentieth century, when historians were concerned with not just 
compiling documents but also analyzing tactical and naval aspects. Garrett Mattingly
(1959) was the first historian focusing on and comparing both Spanish and English 
documentary sources.
It is in 1988, a year of constant celebrations, that there is a turning point of this 
idea of English victory. Both Spanish and English historians participating in several 
conferences and symposia agreed on a military and economic defeat for both countries. 
In this fourth centenary, Fernández-Armesto’s The Spanish Armada (1989) stands out. 
He demystifies the episode by describing first the event as a simple military conflict and 
by negating an English victory. Further histories continue to be written following 
Fernández-Armesto’s steps: James McDermott (2005) and Robert Hutchinson (2010)
narrate a similar experience of myth and moral defeat. Despite such agreement between 
English and Spanish historians, as far as I know, there is not any comparative study on 
the different historical narrations or interpretations on the episode. 
1.2. Objectives 
Thus, the main purpose of this B.A. Thesis is to examine whether the idea 
appearing in the fourth centenary on a common English and Spanish defeat is present in 
texts appearing just after the event; analyzing thus the origin of the myth over the 
English victory and Spanish defeat in the 1588 naval campaign. Moreover, such 
analysis will be carried out from both the Spanish and the English perspectives and
drawing on two documents produced within a year before or after the conflict.
1.3. Methodology 
For such purpose, I have selected A Discourse Concerning the Spanishe Fleete 
Inuadinge Englande in the Yeare 1588 (1590), by Petruccio Ubaldino, and Pedro de 
Ribadeneyra’s Exhortación sobre ‘La Invencible’ (1588) and Sobre las causas de la 
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pérdida de la Armada (1589). The reasons for having selected those texts are very
different in intention and format, but each text is equally and individually valuable in 
their own context. Ubaldino’s narration has been selected because of its importance 
over the ages as it was the only text circulating until the eighteenth century on the 
confrontation itself; moreover, it was the unique source for many historians until 
Laughton’s State Papers (1894) were published. On the other hand, Ribadeneyra’s 
work, focused on the moments prior and posterior to the confrontation itself, has been 
selected because of the acuity of the arguments Ribadeneyra establishes as the reasons 
and causes of the event as they are still remained; furthermore, there is not much more 
written in Spain apart from the earliest chronicles and La Batalla del Mar Océano by 
Gross (1985-2014).
1.4. Results and Interpretation
In the first chapter I will address the tendency that historians had before 1988 to 
say that there was an English victory and a Spanish defeat, but then I will claim that this 
changed in 1988 onwards when they agreed on material and moral defeat for both 
countries. Secondly, I will approach Ubaldino’s analysis on the course of events in 
battle. I will take mainly Garret Mattingly’s The Defeat of the Spanish Armada (1959) 
and Fernádez-Armesto’s The Spanish Armada (1989) as reference to counter his points 
whenever necessary. Thus, through a comparison of what Ubaldino narrated with what 
has been generally thought to happen, I will analyze how accurate Ubaldino’s 
descriptions were and therefore what perception on the event he had. Thirdly, I will 
analyze Ribadeneyra’s exhortation on the Armada and his arguments claiming that the 
invasion was necessary, together with two letters he wrote to Ana Felix de Guzmán and 
King Philip II respectively, in which the reasons for having prepared the oration and the 
reasons for its fall are established. 
Finally, I will finish off my B.A. Thesis comparing both authors. I will focus 
firstly on the aspects that Ubaldino narrates and that still remain true and then in the 
modifications and narrative contributions he incorporated. Likewise, I will evaluate 
Ribadeneyra’s arguments for the invasion, that are still prevailing nowadays, and I will 
estimate the manipulations and narrative contributions he added. I will then contrast
both authors and both accounts in order to evaluate who is analyzing and describing the 
deeds more objectively, who is being more accurate to the reality, and most importantly,
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which the final conclusions are. Thus, after such analysis, it will be possible to conclude 
whether the idea of both countries being defeated is already present in their texts or not. 
1.5. Thesis Statement
Complementing each other by their contrary nature, public and private, factual 
and moral, Ubaldino wrote his work attempting to give an objective reinforcement of
the idea of the English victory; Ribadeneyra’s analysis and vision of the Spanish defeat,
for their part, may be said to be surprisingly accurate, and completely adjusted to facts,
however moralizing his rhetoric and tone may be. The only thing these two unparalleled 
experiences had in common, I conclude, is how unexpected the outcome of the conflict
was for each of the two countries individually. Such unexpectedness is what lies at the 
root of the myth of the English victory and the Spanish defeat in the Armada campaign 
of 1588.
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2The Armada Campaign of 1588: Sources and Interpretations
The conflict with the Spanish Armada of August 1588, representing the height of 
the struggle between Protestant England and Catholic Spain in the second half of the 
sixteenth century, is generally considered to have marked Anglo-Spanish relations for 
centuries and the history of the two countries individually ever since. In line with the 
earliest claims of Elizabethan propaganda, it is commonly understood that the fall of the 
Armada was a defeat at the hands of the English; in line with the contentions of Whig 
historiography, the general belief nowadays is that it was in the aftermath of the Armada
campaign that Elizabeth I’s England consolidated her imperial power and naval force, at 
the same pace that Philip II’s Spain witnessed its deterioration. As shall be seen, those 
two conceptions were only challenged in the last quarter of the twentieth century. This 
may be why the amount of literature published on the occasion in England and in Spain
differs so much, since the Spanish literature on the subject is much less abundant.
2.1 Documentary evidence before 1988
This applies first to the publication of primary sources. In England, the event 
was documented by the end of the nineteenth century, principally in the form of naval 
records and diplomatic correspondence. The Domestic series of The Calendar of State 
Papers in the Elizabethan period, gathered chronological lists of documents or 
manuscripts from the Public Record Office and large sections of material on the 
Armada, especially in volumes 212 to 215. In 1894, John Knox Laughton extracted 
from them his State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, in two
volumes, with registers dating from December 21st, 1587 onwards, written, as Laughton 
stated, to complement Cesáreo Fernández Duro’s La Armada Invencible, published in 
1884-85 (I, xxiv). Indeed, Duro’s compilation was rather incomplete; it merely
reproduced the correspondence maintained between Philip II and his two Admirals from 
copies of the originals. It was in the late 1920s that Enrique Herrera Oria decided to 
enlarge Duro’s selection, including for the first time originals from Simancas in a new 
La Armada Invencible (1929). He was forced to admit, though, how until then the 
majority of documentary or historical work on the Armada came from outside Spain:
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“[a] poco que se consulte la bibliografía sobre la empresa se verá que la mayoría de los 
autores son extranjeros” (x). Herrera Oria (xi) referred in particular to the memories of
Hawkins and Drake, Corbett’s sixteenth century compilation of Papers Relating to the 
Navy During the Spanish War (1585-87) and, of course, to Laughton’s collection, along 
with the work by the English Hispanist Martin Hume in Spanish Calendars (1896), who 
had first reproduced papers originally belonging to the Archives of Simancas, but only 
in English translation: his selection and translation were Anglocentric and imperfect. In
Spain, before 1884, no more than the notorious Relación verdadera del [sic] Armada
[…] en Lisboa (1588) and Medina Sidonia’s Campaign Diary had been printed (Duro 
[v]).
2.2 Perceptions before 1988
It is logic then that the most widespread interpretations of facts followed those of
the English historians. Most of the early political and military accounts of the 1558 
naval engagement published in England reproduced the triumphant spirit of the 
pamphlets, broadsides, and newsletters printed in the years surrounding the event. A
little later, William Camden’s Annales (1615) reconstructed, in patriotic celebration,
the Armada’s preparations, the distribution of English forces, and the first and later
encounters between the Spanish and the English fleets as a series of successful steps on 
the part of the English admirals and soldiers toward their final victory over the 
Spaniards. “Most of [the Spanish] shippes […] very much torne and shot through” and 
“most grievously distressed” were set in contrast with Elizabeth “going as it were in 
triumph, […] through the streetes of London” (s.a. 1588, 28, 35). Camden’s history was
transmitted into the eighteenth century by Thomas Hearne’s new edition of the work of 
1717, so that with regard to the episode it appears that the same victorious sentiment 
still survived in the interpretations of Whig historiography, at the height of the Victorian 
period and of its sea power.
James Aitken Wyley, a prolific writer of the period, wrote an extended version 
of Camden’s account in his three-volume History of Protestantism (1878). The pages 
dedicated to the Armada campaign (23.27-29) included the two commonplaces that, as 
said before, survived until fairly recently attached to its memory, apart from it having 
resulted in a victory by the English. First, the conflict was the turning point in the war 
between Rome and the Reformation: “The tragedy of the Armada was a great sermon 
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preached to the Popish and Protestant nations. The text of the sermon was that England 
had been saved by a Divine hand” (510); and second, it marked the future history of the 
two European nations: “Spain was never after what it had been before the Armada. […] 
England and the Netherlands rose and Spain fell” (510).
The three ideas were popularized in the celebrations that spread all throughout
England at the tercentenary of the “defeat” of the Spanish Armada. Henry Hamilton and 
August Harris put them on stage in September 1888 at the Theatre Royal Drury Lane, in 
their play The Spanish Armada: A Romance of 1588, though with dubious success. The 
opening lines of Lord Macaulay’s “The Spanish Armada: Ballad of Old England”
published in 1832 (5-8) are still probably remembered by the audience:
It was about the lovely close of a warm summer day,        
There came a gallant merchant-ship full sail to Plymouth Bay;
Her crew had seen Castile’s black fleet beyond Aurigny’s isle,
At earliest twilight, on the waves lie heaving many a mile.
Henry Austin Dobson’s jest at the defeat would resound at English prep schools
as late as the 1950s (Fernández-Armesto [v]):
King Philip had vaunted his claims;
He had sworn for a year he would sack us;
With an army of heathenish names
He was coming to fagot and stack us;
Like the thieves of the sea he would track us,
And shatter our ships on the main;
But we had bold Neptune to back us,
And where are the galleons of Spain? […] (“A Ballad of the Armada” 1840)
John Knox Laughton’s had linked both documentary evidence and Whig
interpretation in his State Papers. As it can be read in his introduction, his aim was to
present the evidence available on the superior sailing power of English ships and the 
higher skill of the men who worked them and their armaments and of the result of the 
phenomenon as well as the consequences: “The defeat of the Spanish Armada of 1588 
[…] marks alike the approaching downfall of Spain and the rise of England as a great 
maritime power” (I, [ix]). Just as his collection of documents crowned the author as the 
leading authority on the Armada campaign for decades, the interpretation given in his
introduction also marked the lead.
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The next generation of historians decided to use the most recent information 
available on the episode. For instance, James A. Williamson in The Age of Drake
(1938), using much new material from English, French, and Spanish repositories,
managed to demystify the figure of Drake that Julian Corbett had glorified in Drake and 
the Tudor Navy (1899) by proving how Hawkins was as important in the preparation 
and command of the Queen’s fleet. Most importantly, themes were expanded and 
focused largely on the differing tactical and strategic aspects, shipping and armaments, 
and how these might have had influence on the final events. A good illustration is “The 
Elizabethan Navy and the Armada Campaign” by D. W. Waters (1949), which focused 
on the effects of the tides on the final outcome of the conflict. And yet, the base of their 
interpretations remained essentially the same as Laughton’s: the English Fleet had a 
stronger gun power and was superior in tactics. Michael Lewis’ earlier attempt to 
correct such accepted theory in his comparative study called “Armada Guns” (1942) had 
failed for lack of evidence (Martin and Parker 206).
As pointed out before, Spanish chroniclers and historians had remained rather 
silent on the event, perhaps as a consequence of their assumed defeat. In his Historia 
General del Mundo (1612), Philip II’s chronicler, Antonio de Herrera, only registered
the most painful episodes of the fight, such as the damage to Juan Martín de Recalde’s 
galleon or the captivity of Juan de Valdés, and explained the defeat of the Spanish 
‘Católica Armada’ suggesting that they had missed the occasion of landing at Plymouth
and facing the weak English forces there on deciding to fare on to meet Parma’s second 
Armada (102-3). Carlos Coloma, who seems to have reached Flanders on board of one 
of the Armada ships, contributed details in Las Guerras de los Estados Baxos (1625)
which were also humiliating, like the Spanish lack of provisions and overcrowding of 
soldiers on board of the galleons, along with Hugo de Moncada’s fall in battle (18-20).
Baltasar Porreño’s Dichos y Hechos del Señor Rey Don Felipe II (1639) struggled to 
explain Philip II’s reasons for invading England—English piracy and support of the 
rebellion in Flanders, plus Mary Stuart’s execution—, and proved England’s military 
inferiority and the tempest as cause of the dispersion of the Armada, concluding then
with the famous sentence of the Spanish king: “I did not send my ships to fight against 
the tempest but against the English” (“Yo no envié mis buques a combatir contra las 
tempestades, sino contra los ingleses,” in Rey 878). This low morale must have 
survived until very late because not much was published before Fernández Duro’s work.
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The case of Garret Mattingly’s The Defeat of the Spanish Armada (1959) is very 
illustrative. It should have been very welcome: it was the first complete narration of the 
events, starting with Mary Stuart’s execution and reaching until the months following 
the return of the remaining ships, based not only on the English documents but also the 
Spanish ones and written in a most entertaining, objective style. Indeed, it was a
bestseller and winner of a Pulitzer price and it was immediately translated into Spanish,
but even though the editors gave it title La Armada Invecible, censors prohibited its 
distribution. Gabriel Maura’s El Designio de Felipe II y el Episodio de la Armada 
Invencible (1957) was there in place of it. Mattingly’s final message was then missed as 
said in the preface to Mattingly by Gómez-Centurión (1985): “the signification that with 
the passage of time the Invincible developed in the weak collective of whom 
participated or were witnessed to the event” (14-5. Translation mine). The ‘Invincible’ 
had become mythical on both sides, either defeated or pretendedly ‘invincible.’
2.3 1988: The Four Hundredth Anniversary
As the quadricentennial of the conflict approached, over a hundred books and 
learned articles were being prepared to commemorate it (Martin and Parker xiii), 
together with bilateral conferences, symposia, and exhibitions. A case in point of the 
latter was the fourth Anglo-Spanish conference held in London and Madrid in 1988,
sponsored by the International Commission of Historical Sciences and including 
members of the Gran Armada Commission, among other participants (Rodríguez-
Salgado and Adams v). Mª José Rodríguez-Salgado prepared the largest and most
important exhibition on the Armada ever, Armada 1588-1988. The two events were 
officially recorded in their respective proceedings and catalogue.
The year 1988 was the occasion for historical surveys and revisions. The 
discovery and recovery of wrecks in the 1970s had provided new evidence for naval 
historians and their knowledge on artillery and shipbuilding, so that as many as fifty 
new books appeared in England in the twenty five years following the publication of 
Mattingly (Gómez-Centurión 11). Their most popular focus was how the Armada was 
shrouded in myth and legend and this perhaps blurred behind the strength of traditions, 
whether Whig or conservative.
Felipe Fernández-Armesto’s The Spanish-Armada: The Experience of War in 
1588 (1989) is the best example of that type of revision: “the Armada has played a 
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bigger part than any other single influence in shaping English perceptions of Spain. It 
has also, I think, had a disproportionate part in defining English self-awareness” (vi).
By drawing extensively on personal accounts and analyzing from them and the evidence 
published the purpose and strategy of the Armada and the technical and tactical 
differences between both sides, Fernández-Armesto came to a two-fold conclusion. He 
concluded that the Armada was not an extraordinary war experience and nothing but a
typical episode of sixteenth-century warfare and that, contrarily, a parallel experience
was shared by both sides of failed logistics, chaotic strategic preparations, ineffective 
tactics, struggle against the elements, and material and moral defeat. He held there was 
not such an English victory—the war lasted “until the English desisted and the Armada 
was left to struggle on alone” (vii)—and that more success could be attributed to Spain 
than what was commonly acknowledged, if the war against the weather would not have 
been so invincible. Yet, he may have been too bitterly ironic when contrasting “the 
victorious English dying in the gutter; the defeated Spaniards going home to hospital 
beds and embroidered counterpanes” (223), considering how he attempted to argue for a 
balanced outcome of the campaign and show that the material and moral defeat was 
equal for both countries.
2.4 The Armada Today
In any case, Fernández-Armesto’s challenge of the notion of a Spanish defeat at 
the hands of the English remains largely unchallenged. Very recently, archaeologist and 
historian Robert Hutchinson’s The Spanish Armada (2014), while conceding that fire 
ultimately swung the balance in England’s favor, reiterates that the true destructive 
forces of the Spanish Armada were luck, accident, and the unusually strong summer and 
autumn storms. In line with Fernández-Armesto, Hutchinson also stresses and 
documents the moral and material losses on both parts and the final attempts and 
capacity by Philip II to build future Armadas since 1596.
Only Hutchinson’s book has been translated into Spanish, and yet Fernández-
Armesto’s perspective is now generally accepted. From José Alcalá-Zamora Queipo de 
Llano’s La Empresa de Inglaterra (2010) to the unconventional José Cordero and 
Ricardo J. Hernández’s Operación Gran Armada: La Logística Invencible (2011), the
contention is equally that there was not such a defeat at English hands and that, indeed,
the decline of Spain was not while its administrative and logistic power remained strong 
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well into the seventeenth century. We must be grateful, then, that the fourth volume of 
Jorge Calvar Gross’s La Batalla del Mar Océano (1985-2014), the most fundamental 
historical corpus compilation to date on the naval episode, has finally come out in 2014.
If research on the topic continues to be alive, many new facts and perceptions will be at 
hand.
However, the question to be considered is whether these two versions on the 
event started to appear from the beginning, just when the Armada event took place, or 
whether they had appeared since the fourth centenary. In order to answer that question, 
two accounts recorded just after the war had to be analyzed–Petruccio Ubaldino’s and 
Pedro de Ribadeneyra’s. Ubaldino wrote his narration of the event first by order of Lord 
Howard in 1590; whereas Ribadeneyra wrote his work, La Historia del Scisma, in order 
to contribute to the fight against Protestantism.
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3Petruccio Ubaldino’s Discourse Concerninge the Spanish Fleete 
Inuadinge Englande in the Yeare 1588 (1590)
Only a few basic details have come down to us on the identity of Petruccio 
Ubaldino (d.c.1600). A Florentine artist and scholar, he lived exiled many years in 
Great Britain as courtier and mentor of Edward VI, and perhaps of Mary I, but there is 
no agreement as to the precise dates of his residence among the English. What can be 
immediately acknowledged from the readiest available evidence is his scholarly work: 
his tracts in defense of the House of Medici and lives of the illustrious men in history 
have been preserved. Nowadays, and to the interest of this dissertation, he is renowned 
today for having written an account of the campaign of the Armada of 1588 in two 
different versions within a year of the battle. He published them in English in 1590 with 
the title of Discourse Concerninge the Spanishe Fleete Inuadinge Englande in the Yeare 
1588. The sure success of his work, written from the English point of view, survived its 
time and was then reedited in 1740 with a more emphatic title: A Genuine and Most 
Impartial Narration of the Glorious Victory Obtained by Her Majesty’s Navy over the 
Falsely-stiled Invincible Armada of Spain. This last to be reprinted again in 1919 by 
Henry Y. Thompson, with engravings by John Pine. 
3.1 Textual Transmission
Petruccio Ubaldino wrote two different narrations of the Armada campaign of 
1588, but he preferred to call them ‘commentari’ (Crinò 5). The first one, commissioned 
by Lord Admiral Howard and started from his report, was written in October 1588, 
whereas the second one was written for Vice-Admiral Drake early in the following year, 
apparently because of Drake’s discontent with Howard’s relation of event. Their 
original manuscript texts can now be found in the British Library as part of the Royal 
Manuscripts collection (14 A X and A XI), but their existence remained obscure for 
centuries until Anna M. Crinò unearthed them in 1988. This does not mean that 
Ubaldino’s account had remained unknown until that date as an English translation of 
the first narrative by Augustine Ryther was circulating already in 1590 and, as stated 
earlier, well into the 20th century. 
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The first ‘commentari’ was written in October 1588. It is believed to be a 
summary of some anonymous manuscript version of events dating from the sixteenth 
century (BL Cotton Julius FX) and published, for the first time, by Laughton’s State 
Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada (I, 1-18). It resembles very closely 
a register of the same period by Lord Admiral Charles Howard. That Ubaldino’s Italian 
ornate version was written under Howard’s direction is a fact acknowledged in the 
dedication of the British Library manuscript copy (Laughton, II, 388). 
It is briefer than the second ‘commentari’ (Crinò 5). This one was written 
because Drake was neither happy nor satisfied with the first narration as it did not make 
reference to his nobility but to his preferences for piracy. Drake provided Ubaldino with 
some notes on his participation, but they were neither as accurate nor as precise as 
Howard’s, so the first account of events is more complete and the one transmitted. 
This is basically why our analysis will be based on the first ‘commentari’, not 
least because it was immediately translated into English and it was consistently 
transmitted into our contemporary age. The English translation was commissioned by 
the Yorkshire engraver Augustine Ryther in 1590, and at his expense, but the translator 
himself is just known by the initial ‘T. H.’ It was reedited by Richard Montagu in 1740, 
and dedicated to Francis Howard, descendant of Charles Howard. It is this edition that I 
will refer to here, as it is more readily available than any other and reproduces more 
faithfully the 1590 text, if only in modernized spelling. 
3.2. Preparations and Provisions: November 1587-June 1588
Ubaldino opens his narration with a reference to Philip II’s “mighty fleet,” with 
the “strongest ships […], all sorts of provision and munition necessary” ([3]). By then, 
English people were certain that, as it had been manifested in numerous pamphlets, the 
purpose of such Spanish preparations was the invasion and conquest of England, with 
troops and ships being furnished in the Netherlands to secure the success of the 
enterprise. A contrast is then set by Ubaldino between Philip II and the English Queen, 
who mistrusting Parma’s beguiling offer to peace, was prudent enough to still hurry for 
the preparation of a great fleet “to defend her by sea of the enemy” (6) in less than two 
months. Ubaldino was fully aware that this was a really short time, if it was to be 
compared to the “so many years” (7) employed by the Spaniards in the same 
undertakings. They were four years as Mattingly states (75), during which the arrival of 
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English troops in the Netherlands in support of the Dutch rebels and the continuous 
piracies in the Indies under Drake’s command gradually heightened the tension. 
The false rumor that the Spanish Armada would arrive before Christmas may be 
behind Ubaldino’s record that Elizabeth resolved to provide and furnish her fleet before 
the 20th of December (6-7). However, even after Mary Stuart’s execution, preparations 
still lagged until Philip decided how to reconcile the differing positions of his admirals: 
Santa Cruz’s call for “a direct invasion of England from Spain in a massive, 
overwhelming force” and Parma’s preference for an “invasion [that] would be launched 
from the Netherlands” (Fernández-Armesto 80-1). His decision was that Parma would 
gather an army in the Flemish coasts and Santa Cruz would gather another army to join 
Parma’s and escort it in the course of England (Mattingly 77). That is the reason for 
reading in Ubaldino that it was not until mid-June that Howard, along with his Vice-
Admiral Sir Francis Drake, Henry Seymour, and ninety ships were gathering for battle 
at Plymouth (8-9), probably having received positive news that the Armada had by then 
left Corunna for the English Channel.
Such grandeur of the Spanish Armada–“the number of the ships, mariners and 
soldiers, the diverse sorts of quantities of victuals, the great number and various kinds 
of artillery” (4)–and the necessarily urgent preparations that the English thus presented 
by Ubaldino surely enhanced the figure of the man that had been put in care and in 
charge of the English navy. Charles Howard incidentally had commissioned the 
author’s work, “the right and honorable Charles Lord Howard” (7), and his company of 
men, all praised by him for their honorability, worshipfulness, bravery and talents (7-8), 
more than could have been “so subtil and malicious enemy” (6).
3.3 First Sightings: June-July 1588
According to Ubaldino, Howard kept watch of the English coast, sometimes 
drawing near France sometimes near the coast of England for roughly a week, after that 
returning to Plymouth “to refresh his company” (9). The Armada was yet not to be seen 
near England. Around the 16th June, news arrived about “certain ships of the Spanish 
fleet, not above the number of 14” (10) being separated from the rest by a great tempest 
in the area between Ushant and Scilly. Only the perseverance of the storms and the 
unfavorable winds prevented Howard’s passing onto the coasts of Spain to destroy the 
Armada (Mattingly 260-61). 
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On the 29th of July, in Ubaldino’s account, there is the first discovery of the 
Armada near Lyzard (11-2). The near threat and the unfavorable wind served Ubaldino 
speak at length of the skills that the English showed in marine discipline, portraying all 
masters and officers conducting themselves in the fifty-four ships, “diligent and 
industrious” (13). This was the only way to assure “hope or certain victory” (13) against 
the impressive defense array of the Spanish Armada, displayed in the manner of a moon 
crescent, “her horns extended in wideness about the distance of 8 miles” (14). Ubaldino 
took pride in soberly describing Lord Admiral in his Ark Royal, commanding a pinace 
to give defiance to the Duke of Medina Sidonia (14). The fight was imminent. 
3.4 The First Battle: 31st July
How effective the Spanish defensive formation could be would be soon tested in 
the morning of July 31st in two different fronts: one at the forefront, between Howard 
and pretendedly Medina Sidonia, and the other in the rearguard, between Drake and 
Martín de Recalde. 
Ubaldino’s claim that the first fight “continued so long and so hot, that diverse 
other ships […] of the Spanish fleet came to her succor” (14-15) may have helped to 
open his narration in epic terms, but seems to be contradicted by evidence. First, the 
engagement was neither between the two Lord Admirals, but between Howard and 
Alonso de Leyva, nor between the two flagships, but between the Ark Royal and the 
Rata Coronada, where Howard mistakenly thought Medina Sidonia to be, “considering 
[…] the say’d ship was so well accompanied by others” (14). It also appears that the 
fighting was not as long or as fierce as Ubaldino took pride in reporting. It is now 
known that no sooner had Howard realized that the Rata Coronada was not commanded 
by the Duke, he fired no more than a few broadsides and left; there were no casualties or 
rescues (Mattingly 279). Furthermore, the implied message in Ubaldino’s short sentence 
that it was the English defiance that had made the Spanish fleet come in help may be 
understood otherwise: the Spaniards seemed well prepared to immediately frustrate the 
enemy’s tactics.
The case with the fight at the rearguard is very similar. While Ubaldino 
sustained similarly that “this fight was so well maintained […] that the enemy was so 
enforced to leave his place” (15), evidence suggests contrarily that Sir Francis Drake, 
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John Hawkins, and Martin Frobisher, in the Revenge, Victory, and Triumph, stood off at 
the prudent distance of three hundred yards (Mattingly 281), that their fire was timid 
and at long range (Fernández-Armesto 141), and that it was the English that were put to 
flight by Medina Sidonia’s offensive (Mattingly 281).
In fact, “a cut forestay and two great shot lodged in the foremast [of Recalde’s 
ship] after an hour’s battering” (Fernández-Armesto 158), registered today as the only 
damage done to the Spanish Armada, and by three of the most heavily-gunned ships in 
the Queen’s fleet, were mishaps not even registered by Ubaldino. Instead, Ubaldino 
replaced them by the bigger loss of the Nuestra Señora del Rosario, which collided 
while succoring the San Salvador, and by the explosion and ruin of the latter, claimed 
by Ubaldino to be the work of a Flemish gunner’s resentment against his Spanish 
captain, as the latter had abused the former’s wife “according to the custom of that 
nation” (15-16). He included the damage of those two ships there, even if in case were 
they caused by the action of the English, but by accident or petty treason.
On balance, then, the ‘jornada’ of the 31st was not so favorable to the English as 
Ubaldino liked to suggest, but a failed experience for both sides. The English 
dissatisfaction may be implied in Ubaldino’s recording of Howard’s considering at the 
end of the day that “he wanted as yet 40 ships” (17) and his appointment of the night 
watch; the Spaniards’, by the fact that Medina Sidonia was planning to abandon his 
defensive tactic and rearrange his ships in three columns (Mattingly 281).
3.5 The treasures found: 1st August
The next day was one of plundering for the English. Drake had left his watch to 
prey upon the Rosario. He received Pedro de Valdés as his prisoner and sent the ship to 
Darmouth. Howard and Hawkins for their part went aboard the San Salvador, towed it 
to Weymouth but found that it was to be with little profit: “they understood that the 
Spaniards had taken out of her the best things they could” (20); Ubaldino, however, 
recreated the “lamentable sight” of the men “miserably burned” on board (20).
Indeed, the capture of the Rosario was a heavy blow and much held in reproach 
against Medina Sidonia upon his return to Spain (Fernández-Armesto 171). Thus, it has 
been interpreted as the start of the weakening of morale among Spaniards, only 
comparable to the animosities that had emerged in the English command: while the 
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Spaniards always resented Pedro de Valdés surrendering to Drake’s fame as his 
prisoner, Drake’s indiscipline and transgression by leaving his watch was only appeased 
by envy and hopes of gaining part of the bounty of the Rosario (Mattingly 294).
At the close of the day, the Spaniards are portrayed by Ubaldino in poor 
resolution. They “entreprised nothing, either for that they saw they could not safely do it 
or else because their minds were not thoroughly settled upon that which before they 
thought to do” (21). But the truth seems to be that the Spaniards did modify their 
formation, by ordering a continuous grouping to be formed of the vanguard under 
Alonso de Leyva and the rearguard under Medina Sidonia (Mattingly 296). It is the 
English, rather, Fernández-Armesto suggests (198), that insisted on their cutting out 
tactics, even though they were a failure, as proved to him by Recalde’s episode one 
among several in which they could not destroy the most exposed ships.
Perhaps it all could be best summarized as one common failed experience, but 
two reactions: reproach and celebration.
3.6 The Second Battle: 2nd August 
Ubaldino correctly registered that the following morning began with the 
Spaniards’ advantage of windward position at north east, toward the land, which made 
the English fear they could reach the coast (14). This windward advantage soon 
changed, never to be regained again, except for brief intervals, as Fernandez-Armesto 
reminds us (151). However, this the opportunity Ubaldino seized to praise the Queen’s 
fleet for “being very good at sail and stirrage” (22), two qualities still acknowledged 
these days, which in tactical terms clearly defined the characteristic abhorrence of 
boarding of the English:
[T]he English, who, with their ships, being (as was aforesay’d) excellent of sail and 
stirrage, yet less a great deal than the Spanish ships, and therefore more light and 
nimble, fought not at all, according to their manner otherwise, to board them, but 
keeping themselves aloof at a reasonable distance, continually beat upon the hull and 
tacklings of their enemies ships, which, being considerably higher, could not so 
conveniently beat the English ships with their ordnance. (26)
Such tactical skill would be set against “the huge greatness and height of the Spaniards 
ships” (22), and their sticking on their boarding tactics out of conceit (21), with the 
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result that Howard’s fleet made the Spaniards edge away in the two minor assaults that 
occurred on that second of August.
Nevertheless, once more, evidence seems to speak otherwise. In the first assault 
Ubaldino registered that, for about an hour and a half, the Triumph and five ships which 
were severed from the rest of the Queen’s navy were given assault by the Spanish 
galleases under the command of Hugo de Moncada. Instead of the Spaniards being 
“inforced to give them way”, as in Ubaldino’s narrative (23), it seems that Medina 
Sidonia intercepted them “with 16 of his best galleons” (22), with resources enough to 
also rescue the San Martín from enemy harassment (Mattingly 299-300). Otherwise, 
there is no other way to understand how Howard would have felt the need to call “other 
of the Queene’s ships” and “not to discharge any one piece of ordnance before they 
should come within a musket shot of the enemy” (23). In fact, if the Spaniards were 
“inforced to give place and to retire unto their array of battle”, in Ubaldino’s faithful 
record (23), this was because the wind shift in favor of the English dictated it (Mattingly 
298).
The ineffectiveness of the tactics of both parties is again nuanced by Fernández-
Armesto: “Neither [of them] […] was capable of defeating, or even seriously damaging, 
the enemy” (135). While the Spaniards had no hope of catching their elusive enemies, 
the English found their tactics useless against the Spanish discipline and great 
expenditure of shot (Mattingly 300-1). However, Ubaldino simply set record of a 
Spanish withdrawal that was not such.  
3.7 A Day’s Respite: 3rd August
The third of August is described by Ubaldino as a day in which there was no 
engagement, “by reason of a great calm which fell out” (27). Ubaldino’s account 
admitted that the English were designing a way to acquire more offensive power by 
asking for a new supply of munition and dividing their fleet into four squadrons (26-27), 
but would not acknowledge any indication of weakness, and rather contrast it with a 
suggestion that the Spaniards were happy to use their time in repairing leaks (30-31), 
something for which there is no other record. Conversely, Ubaldino silenced that there 
was a duel on the rearguard between the Gran Grifón and Drake’s Revenge and that,
when Medina Sidonia called for battle, the English retired and eluded the fight 
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(Mattingly 304). As a result, the Spaniards had certainly not been able to land thanks to 
the agility of the English ships and Frobisher’s tough defense, but they still sailed on 
(Mattingly 305).
3.8 The Fourth Battle and Further Recruitment: 4th and 5th August 
A new target was set for the Queen’s navy. The San Luis de Portugal and Santa 
Ana, a galleon and a merchant ship, were beset by Hawkins, to whom the Lord Admiral 
himself and Thomas Howard joined later on. As on previous occasions, Ubaldino 
depicted a scene where the Armada was put to flight by enemy action: “they did them 
much harm—one of them requiring the help of the rest, being succoured by them, 
returned unto the fleet” (28). Yet, it has been noted how damages on the Spanish 
galleases may have been used to exaggerate English naval efficiency, as with the ship 
which reportedly “was taken away her light” or the one which “lost her beck” (28). A 
light taken away is practically no harm at all, and so is a lost beck, especially 
considering how the galleases in question were repaired, contributing to the fight half an 
hour later (Mattingly 306).
In the following engagement, Ubaldino depicted a mirroring scene, if only it is 
an English ship, the Triumph, which was likely to be caught by the enemy and towed 
away by her friends. The action is the exact counterpart but it is interpreted differently: 
this time the English ship was not forced to leave the place by the enemy, but rather her 
friends “jointly saved” her (30). Indeed, Mattingly observes how close the Armada was 
of boarding her, had the wind not freshened on her favor (308), a fact also 
acknowledged by Ubaldino, though merely in passing (30). Fernández-Armesto is quick 
to point out how the advantage of the wind was used by the Queen’s navy not to assault 
the Armada but to seek refuge at Dover (146).
On the following day, the fight ceased: while the Spaniards made provisions, the 
English reunited fresh forces. Howard appears to be celebrating the battle as a victory, 
by his granting the honour of knighthood to lords and gentlemen in the service of the 
Queen (31). It would seem neither tactic so far has yielded but frustrating effects.
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3.9 Toward the final battle: 6th-8thAugust
On the 6th August, towards the evening, Ubaldino states that the Armada 
anchored in Calais and “sent tidings unto the Duke of Parma of their Arrival” (32), 
following on Philip II’s plan that Medina Sidonia would be united to the forces that had 
been gathering on the Flemish coast for one year. Parma made no reply, probably 
feeling the right time for fighting had been missed: of the 33,000 soldiers he had 
recruited by the beginning of the year, only half of them had survived from hunger and 
disease (Mattingly 193). The English must not have been aware of that, just as Medina 
Sidonia would still trust Parma’s army was ready to embark. Ubaldino recorded the 
news of Parma’s preparations with “a great number of tuns of water and 10,000 foot 
men” and Howard’s refreshing his fleet with more troops and munition (31-32), 
applying “his wits” to a plan that would prevent the forces of the enemy from being 
united: “he provided 8 small ships dressed with artificial fire, to the intent to drive the 
same upon the Spanish fleet” (33).
This time, the English stratagem, which was carried out on August 7th, was 
diligent and effective:
[T]he enemy was not only inforced to break his sleep, but the fire coming so suddenly 
upon him (not remembering himself at the very instant of time of another remedy, either 
more safe for himself, or more excusable) to cut his cables, to let slip his anchors, and to 
hoise up sails, as the only way to save his fleet from so imminent and unexpected a 
mischief. (34)
The sight of the English fireships in the distance made them think that they were 
Giambelli’s ‘hellburners” and fear that they would scatter flaming and fire miles around 
with the explosives they surely contained (Mattingly 323-24). The tumult and confusion 
among the Spaniards was as immense as described above and had unexpected 
consequences: the chief galleases collided, one of them graveled, the rest were 
dispersed, 22,000 ducats of gold were seized, and prisoners were made.
Ready as Ubaldino always was to praise English naval skills, he was never too 
harsh on the Spaniards when real misfortune came about: when the San Lorenzo ran 
aground and Hugo de Moncada was felled in her defense, he described him as “a noble 
and valiant man” (35). And he would not rush to celebrate victory but portray the 
cautionary reaction on the part of the English: after all, the Armada was still able to 
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recover its moon shape formation (Mattingly 332). Howard had to make sure that the
Armada had abandoned its plan of going to England. Lord Admiral gave order to 
Seymour and Wynter to continue to watch for Parma in the Channel (39) while 
“determined to follow the Spaniards” on their way North (40), an action whose end was 
unknown: other intents of the Armada upon England were perfectly possible, as 
Fernández-Armesto rightly reminds us (201). But this was the end: the wind remained 
remorselessly in the north-west, strong enough to drive the Spaniards on” (Fernández-
Armesto 202). The Spaniards kept their course about the Orkneys and had could only 
but return that way into Spain along the north coast of Scotland facing evident danger.
Ubaldino merely had to confirm Howard’s return to England the 17th August, 
“by reason of a tempest”, while the Spanish Armada continued in the northern seas 
“tossed up and down until the end of September” (42). Most unexpectedly, upon his 
return in Spain, Medina Sidonia counted 32 ships lost, over 13,000 casualties, and more 
than 2000 prisoners (43). In the month of November, public thanks were given 
throughout the whole realm, that “the Common Safety of them all was accomplished by 
the special favor of God, the father of all good things” (44).
22 
 
 4
Pedro de Ribadeneyra’s Exhortación sobre ‘La Invencible’ (1588) 
and Sobre las causas de la pérdida de la Armada (1589)
Unlike Ubaldino’s, Ribadeneyra’s biography may be detailed from numerous 
sources. Apart from his own Confesiones (1611) and collected letters, included in 
Monumenta Ribadeneirae (1920-23), there were three other biographies, one 
contemporary by Cristóbal López, two from the nineteenth-century by Juan María Prat 
and Vicente de la Fuente, before Eusebio Rey edited his sketch in Historias de la 
Contrarreforma (1945 xxxv-lxxiii), available today in reprint. Born in 1526, 
Ribadeneyra joined the Society of Jesus in 1540 and became priest in 1553. It is in one 
of his missions as a Jesuit that he met the Count of Feria, with whom he travelled to 
London as chaplain and spiritual adviser of his family. During this stay, Ribadeneyra 
had the intention of establishing the Society of Jesus there; however, upon Mary 
Stuart’s execution, and therefore Elizabeth’s imposition of Protestantism, this could not 
be done without risking martyrdom. Such failed attempt and some health problems 
drove him out of England, settling in Italy until 1574, when he finally returned to Spain. 
It is after that that he took up historical writing, gaining an immediate success with the 
publication of the first and second parts of his Historia Ecclesiastica del Scisma de 
Inglaterra (1588, 1890), allowing him such fame that he was asked to preach at Philip’s 
court, who granted him permission to establish the Society of Jesus in the Low 
Countries.
The two documents that shall be studied here belong precisely to the interim 
between the publication of the first and second parts of the Historia del scisma, and are 
dated immediately before and after the Armada campaign of 1588: Ribadeneyra’s 
oration Exhortación sobre ‘La Invencible’ (1588) and letter Sobre las causas de la 
pérdida de la Armada (1589).
4.1 Textual History
Let us start by describing briefly the textual history of those two pieces. The 
original manuscript of the first one, “Exhortación para los soldados y capitanes que van 
a esta jornada de Inglaterra, en nombre de su Capitán General,” is kept at the Biblioteca 
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Nacional in Madrid (cod. Matrit. IV, ff. 189v-201v) and was first published in 1923 
in Monumenta Ribadeneira (II 347-70). It will be analysed in conjunction with the letter 
sent from Ribadeneyra to Ana Félix de Guzmán, dated May 1588 (cod. Matrit. IV, 33, 
ff. 188-189) and also made public in that same volume containing epistles, orations, and 
diverse other writings by the Spanish Jesuit (Monumenta II 92-93). The second one, 
“Carta de Ribadeneyra para un privado de Su Majestad sobre las causas de la pérdida de 
la Armada,” may be found in the same collection and series (cod. Matrit. IV, 34, ff. 
147v-150v) and is dated at the close of 1588. The three make up the final part of 
Eusebio Rey’s Historias de la Contrarreforma, whose 2009 edition has been handled in 
the writing of this dissertation.
A number of details about the intended addressees and purpose of the two 
documents remain obscure. The exhortation was intended to uplift the hearts of the 
soldiers in that crucial moment. It was originally written to be appended to his first part 
of the Historia del scisma, but he restrained himself from doing it, he confessed to Anna 
de Guzman, “out of due respects” (“por justos respetos”, Ribadeneyra, “Carta a doña 
Anna”, in Rey 1331). So Ribadeneyra let Anna de Guzmán know that he would like it 
to be read to the soldiers and captains of the Armada upon their departure in Lisbon, 
asking her to pass it on to Medina Sidonia, her son-in-law, for that end, on condition 
that she would not disclose his authorship. The letter addressed to the King of Spain 
was also sent through an unnamed private of His Majesty. Rey suggests he may be Juan 
de Idiáquez, chief secretary of state and war (1355n) and believed it to be the condensed 
anticipation of what became his Tratado de la Tribulación (1589).
It is not known exactly whether any of the two documents ever reached their 
intended recipients. Rey supposes that the exhortation did not, whereas the priest, that is 
once mentioned to have counseled the King on the oppressed in his kingdom, may be a 
possible allusion to the opening of the Jesuit’s letter, and thus an indication that Philip II 
did read his letter (879).
4.2 Exhortación sobre ‘La Invencible’ (1588)
The opening of Ribadeneyra’s exhortation refers directly to the Spaniards’ trust 
in the happy ending and conclusion of the enterprise the Armada was about to 
undertake. However, he must have sensed a tinge of hesitation as to the legitimacy of 
the Spanish resolution to invade England for he starts by justifying its rightness and 
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holiness. To remove any doubt, he provided his intended audience with three main 
objects for sailing for England to wage war on that nation, three objects that clarified 
that this was a defensive and not an offensive war (“que es guerra defensiva y no 
ofensiva,” in Rey 1333). Those three objects were the defense of religion, the defense of 
the reputation of the King and his nation, and the defense of the welfare and properties 
of the Spanish people; the three had been subject to much grievance and offence coming 
from England and with that opens the first part of his exhort.
He started off by reminding the many times that England has been insulting God 
since Henry VIII’s days, not only by destroying and desecrating monasteries, arresting 
and martyring Catholics, but also by sitting a woman on the throne, much against all 
ecclesiastical canons, since “being a woman and naturally subject to man” (“siendo 
mujer y sujeta naturalmente al varón,” in Rey 1334) could never be acknowledged as 
the spiritual head of the Church. Of all the good many evils that Elizabeth could be 
charged of by Ribadeneyra, the worst one was to have allowed ‘diabolical’ unbelievers 
coming from different ‘infected’ provinces to establish themselves in England, turning 
the land into a “cave of snakes,” from where the “destructive and consuming fire of 
heresy would blaze up throughout the world” (in Rey 1334-35). Yet, that was not the 
only thing that mattered. She was destabilizing the nation after having killed Mary 
Stuart and supported rebellion in Flanders for decades, harassing the Spanish ports of 
Galicia, Cadiz, and the West Indies; and this before the eyes of the entire world (in Rey 
1335-36). Surely, such shameful recklessness and temerity had exhausted Spanish 
patience (in Rey 1338).
Spain, then, had a three-fold mission to defend the Catholic faith, the King’s 
reputation and the interests of the nation. Enough had been said about the need to 
defend the Catholic faith, but now it was time to remind everyone of the need to accept 
the responsibility: he would ask rhetorically, to inquire which kingdom in Christendom 
had the strength and could take arms against England? (“¿Qué reino de toda la 
cristiandad tiene fuerzas y puede hoy ir a tomar las armas contra el de Inglaterra?,” in 
Rey 1337). 
It was surely Spain, uncorrupted as it was by the heretics, reputed also among all 
nations for the extension of its Empire without limit (“los límites de su imperio son los 
límites del mundo,” in Rey 1339), and commanded by an able ruler of peace. The only 
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trouble was in Flanders and it lasted because Elizabeth sustained it; the harassment of 
far-away parts of the Empire also came from England and her piracies. Such impudence 
was to be punished and it should be too difficult: a beetle cannot fight an eagle; nor can 
a mouse fight an elephant (in Rey 1340).
Besides, the war in Flanders was costly for Spain, Ribadeneyra reminded (in 
Rey 1339). Fond of metaphors, his oration would illustrate the necessity of warring 
England, otherwise, as long as the disease exists, its effects will continue, and, as long 
as the spider exists, the house will be full of cobwebs regardless of how clean you mean 
to keep it (in Rey 1342). Putting an end to the war in Flanders, then, would result in 
fewer outlays there but also weaker threat to the ships coming from the Indies and on 
which the commerce of Spain depended so much (in Rey 1345).
Only after having thus justified the necessity of war could Ribadeneyra finish off 
his exhort with words which is of greatest interest to these pages: “ours is victory”
(“nuestra es la victoria,” in Rey 1349). Regardless of the evidence he put forward to 
sound convincing, like trusting past experience whereby, when Spain had won her 
victories despite being less numerous or England had been dispossessed of all her 
French possessions (in Rey 1346-7), his conviction that the Spanish Armada would as 
so whole and entire and without a brink that on writing Ana de Guzmán, Ribadeneyra 
also set plans for Medina Sidonia once the Armada had set foot on conquered England:
May he once arrived in England distinguish Catholics from heretics […] and may he 
pay heed […] not to ruin the temples, which, serving now the devil as they are in their 
sacrilegious rites, may serve the Lord as they did in old times. (in Rey 1332)
[Q]ue llegados a Inglaterra sepa hacer diferencia de los católicos y de los herejes […] y 
que se tenga en gran cuenta […] no arruinar los templos, que, aunque ahora sirvan al 
demonio en sus ritos sacrílegos, podrán servir al Señor como sirvieron en otros tiempos 
(in Rey 1332)
How justified his taking victory for granted was before the start of the campaign 
is not the question here, but rather how unexpected the outcome would after such 
reasoning and sentiment be.
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4.3 Sobre las causas de la pérdida de la Armada (1589)
Three months passed and no news were received from the Channel. In the 
meantime, Ribadeneyra enjoyed the success of his Historia del Scisma. The rumor gave 
way to the certain news that the invading plan had failed. If Ribadeneyra’s earlier exhort 
was meant to justify and create a proper atmosphere for the Spanish naval campaign, 
once the disaster was confirmed, it was time for serious reflection.
Such was the purpose of Ribadeneyra’s letter to King Philip II. As 
unaccountable as the outcome had been, knowing that everything happens under God’s 
will, Ribadeneyra sought to share with the king what he had pondered on the causes of 
such “universal scourge and punishment” (“azote y castigo universal,” in Rey 1352) 
which he could enumerate in writing.
Firstly, the King should make amends for the common people that had been 
dispossessed, imprisoned, or merely afflicted by the heavy charges laid on them, not for 
the King to finance the expedition, but for his ministers to obtain benefit unrightfully: 
there was no way the Armada could succeed, for “it was loaded with the sweating and 
cursing of so many miserable people” (“iba cargada con los sudores y maldiciones de 
tanta gente miserable,” in Rey 1352). And secondly, the King should keep his accounts 
very neatly and examine the men at his service to figure out how his gross income could 
be going out as it was, perhaps through bad administration or even disloyalty. He should 
not forget, echoing Thomas More, the sentence: “[m]oney is the nerve of war” (“La 
hacienda es el nervio de la Guerra,” in Rey 1353).
Thirdly, the King had to judge whether the attack on England was more for the 
sake of earthly interests than of God’s glory. He may have forgotten to protect the 
Catholics under the persecution of Queen Elizabeth as he should, too careful not to 
offend her. Then, sins and scandals should be removed from the public eye, especially 
in the case of those who are expected to serve as examples of imitation to others and 
also, the King should restrain from participating too eagerly in the government of 
religious affairs; let no other future kings think that they can dispose on religions at will. 
Finally, the king should know that the greatest riches of a kingdom are not found in its 
gold and silver but in its brave and liberal people, the pillars of any republic.
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This is certainly very much like preparing the king with an examination of 
conscience. There is an obvious change of tone, graver than the previous exhortation,
and nearly consolatory. However, it is to be noted how Ribadeneyra never mentions the 
word ‘defeat.’ Not only because of the spiritual benefits to be gained from the 
experience, like to humble oneself before the power of God, but principally, because in 
him, as in many more in the nation, the attachment to the idea of military victory was 
still resilient, as when speaking of victory and God’s will, he wrote: “I think to myself 
that He didn’t mean to keep it from us, but to postpone it a little while” (“Yo para mí 
tengo que no ha sido querérnosla negar, sino dilatarla un poco de tiempo,” in Rey 
[1352]). And therefore, the urgency for victory resides in his words, as much as the 
impending need to seek for the enemy and wage on war: “dura todavía la necesidad 
precisa de llevar la guerra adelante y buscar al enemigo” (in Rey 1352).
Despite Ribadeneyra’s tone still surviving, it is now known that certainly Philip 
II had the power to send the Armada twice again in 1596 and 1597; the former “was 
driven back by storms”, but the latter:
[S]ailed with a rational plan, based on the securing a safe haven at Falmouth; […] was 
overwhelming powerful—outnumbering the English in fighting ships of all classes, 
attaining an ‘invincibility’ which that of 1588 had possessed in nothing but name—[…] 
when the weather again intervened  […] and dispersed it. (Fernández-Armesto 270)
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5A Contrastive Analysis of Ubaldino and Ribadeneyra on the Armada 
Campaign
This chapter will set Ubaldino’s and Ribadeneyra’s contributions side by side 
with an aim to qualify their individual natures and then differentiate the way in which 
each relates to the differing experience of the 1588 Armada campaign that has 
prevailed in the two nations throughout history. I will analyze each of the two 
contributions in three different ways: facts or arguments in their accounts that are still 
held to be true, the modifications and omissions that play a part in the narrative, and any 
particular aspect or detail on the author’s own contribution, that may better characterize
their respective perspectives.
5.1 A Critique of Ubaldino’s Narrative
The greatest part of the facts recorded by Ubaldino in his narration of the 
Armada episode has been corroborated by later evidence. Modifications and omissions 
were naturally present, we do not know whether intentionally or unintentionally, but 
they were repeated and quite significantly. Very often, the interpretation of facts reflects 
a naturally Anglocentric bias.
To begin with, much of the strategic detail included in the preliminary stages 
was confirmed to be true. For instance, the English fleet was already prepared on the 
20th of December and the way of organizing the English fleet can be also testified: that 
Drake was sent to the west and Seymour went with Lord Admiral to watch out for 
Parma, but that when they heard news of the Armada approaching, Howard joined 
Drake at Plymouth. At this stage, nothing in his account refers to the Armada’s 
preparation and supplies, however; the Spaniards only come on the scene when 
Ubaldino was describing the English already in the sea and their first sightings off 
Ushant and Scilly, and finally off Lyzard and Eddistone, when the fight is imminent. 
Thus, the narrative opened with a totally English perspective.
When confrontations began, Ubaldino seemed to take special trouble to register 
faithfully the earliest and almost only losses of the Armada. It is true that neither 
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the San Salvador nor the Nuestra Señora del Rosario could continue fighting, though it 
were following accident or treason and no enemy action, but Ubaldino did not miss the 
opportunity to tell about the capture of the two by the English later on the first of 
August, building on the Spanish losses falsely as merits earned by the English tactics. 
The same could be said of the registered and attested fact that Hawkins set on the San 
Luis de Portugal and Santa Ana, left damage in a light and in a beck on two of the 
Spanish galleases. Registered as the facts should be, Ubaldino silenced that such small 
harm was not an impediment to continue to fight half an hour later and to great 
effect. Contrariwise, Ubaldino would omit any mishap on the English side that could 
speak in similar terms of misfortune or unskillfulness, like for instance, in the night of 
July 31st, when the English fleet found itself by accident between the horns of the 
Armada defensive formation, believing the light of the Spanish flagship was Drake’s, 
who had disobeyed Howard and left his watch; this was better omitted for posterity to 
be able to argue for the exact opposite.
Sometimes those double standards were applied to exactly mirroring scenes and 
very consistently. Most of the times, in most battles, not only those fought by Howard, 
but also by Drake, were repeatedly described by Ubaldino as being well maintained on 
the part of the English and forcing the Spaniards to sail away, though the case was 
proved that the English would elude battling in their tactic to avoid grappling by all 
possible means. A good illustration may be what happened on the second of August, 
described by Ubaldino as a Spanish withdrawal, when in fact the Spanish fleet was not 
running away but going to help Recalde which was beset by several English ships. And 
yet, when the San Martín was left on her own and the English taking advantage of that, 
when the Spanish galleons arrived to support her, again the English fled from the place. 
Again, on the 4th of August, Ubaldino described that Hawkins attacked some Spanish 
galleons and caused one such harm that it had to be helped by the others to return to the 
Armada, but on that same day, Ubaldino wrote that when the Triumph was left alone 
and the Armada tried to board it, the English fleet honorably saved it, when the truth 
was that the Triumph helped itself thanks to a change in the weather.
From Ubaldino’s account anyone would understand that the final battle and the 
dispersion of the Armada were the effective result of the English stratagem of the fire 
ships. Ubaldino did not say though that it was more the Spaniards belief that they were 
‘hellburners’ what caused the chaos than the actual effectiveness of the fire ships that 
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carried no explosives on them and that it was rather the coalescence of storm and lack of 
munition that prevented both the English and the Spanish from continuing fighting.
It may be further argued that Ubaldino interpretative contributions were most 
frequently employed in praise of English tactics and skill and rarely used in recognizing
any sign of weakness. Just as in the opening of the text, Howard was exalted at the 
expense of the description of the magnificent Armada, on the 29th of July, when the 
English fleet could not set off from Plymouth on account of the weather conditions, 
Ubaldino liked to describe that some ships managed to go out thanks to Howard’s 
splendid skills. Contrarily, on the 31st of July, Ubaldino narrated the end of the battle as 
Howard deciding to wait for the rest of the English fleet, which was still at Plymouth, to 
do a better service; this may be nothing more but a beautiful way of saying that the 
ships that were already fighting against the Armada were not enough to win.
5.2 A Critique of Ribadeneyra’s Exhortation and Letter to Philip II
As for Ribadeneyra’s exhortation, many arguments he provided for the invasion 
of England would be considered true and sound by many research the topic today, if 
only perhaps expanding on the economic pragmatic reasons behind it. On the other 
hand, the one or other manipulation can be found in great measure by constantly 
blaming England of all sorts of mischief. His own contributions are to be found mainly 
here, in a most condemnatory mood toward England and her Queen.
His main focus is religious, as when establishing that the enterprise should be 
carried out because Elizabeth was disobeying the Pope, prohibiting mass, destroying 
images, and torturing Catholics. There is no denying that the Counterreformation was a 
strong force at the time. Nevertheless, his argument about the costs of the wars bleeding 
Spain would easily today be taken into serious account. Mattingly, among other 
historians, claims that this was the main reason for carrying out the enterprise. English 
help in the war of Flanders, as well as their attack over Cadiz or the West Indies, were 
draining the Spanish arks. Another argument Ribadeneyra provides for the invasion that 
may be considered well-based is that the reputation of the king and of the nation should 
be cared for as a guarantee of peace with the rest of the world. Ribadeneyra shows then 
the qualities of a first-class political analyst, an acute discerning sense, capable of 
identifying the key factors at play in the Anglo-Spanish relations of the time.
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Most of Ribadeneyra’s distortion of facts can be blamed some overwrought 
rhetoric and qualifying statements of a very negative character directly addressed at the 
adversary. We should remind how he described Elizabeth as a “terrible monster,” the 
heresies as “foul-smelling ministers of Satan,” and England as a “cave of snakes,” also 
the way in which he supported the idea of invading England for her likeness to disease 
or the workings of a spider.
No doubt Ribadeneyra is very particular in his writings. He is also very original. 
His greatest narrative contributions may be found in the letter addressed to Philip II and 
the reasons he provided for the falling of the Armada. When describing them, he is now 
dives into the most problematic issues of the Spanish gigantic administrative body and 
its disrespect for the common people, ranging from inefficacy to corruption through 
public scandals. One does not know whether he believed himself to be acting as a 
political counselor of the king or as his confessor.
5.3 The Contrastive Analysis of Events and Accounts
If we look merely at events, it can be asserted that there was in all some English 
technical, as well as tactical, superiority shown throughout this campaign. Their ship 
steerage and armament were better and Howard was capable of devising new techniques 
with certain effect, even though in general terms the Queen’s ships would be more 
defensive and elusive in their tactics than the Armada. The strategies of the Spaniards 
were also basically defensive and proved relatively ineffective in attack; their reliance 
and stubborn adherence on the boarding strategy is an indication of their inability to 
adapt to the northern seas. Yet, the Armada had a much greater capacity to stay at sea 
with no need to get supplies and their discipline was also undeniable. They could not do 
much about the heaviness of the ships but surely better coordination could have been 
sought and a way to establish a safe harbor looked after. In this way the first conclusion 
that may be reached is that there was no English victory in the fight, but an unfortunate
fall of the Armada and a corresponding weakening of their morale.
But by comparing, not facts, but the accounts themselves, however, a better 
insight may be gained. The first obvious thing to be seen is that the two are very clearly 
different in nature: one more factual, the other much more argumentative; one prepared 
and written to be read as widely spread as possible, the other to be read almost in 
mediation. One would expect the former to be more objective and the latter more prone 
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to subjective view, but it may well be the opposite. Ubaldino’s account, being more 
dependent on the expectations of the public, was surely more inclined to fulfill them by 
twisting his interpretation of facts; Ribadeneyra, moving on more private scene, could 
aim to reach some truth beyond facts, however biased it might be. By contrasting so 
very different accounts, and especially being stricken by Ribadeneyra’s exhortations, 
what it teaches us is that, despite Ubaldino’s occasional manipulation of events in favor 
of England and Ribadeneyra’s sure moralizing tone against her, it is not facts that would 
decide on the whole experience of the 1588 Armada campaign, but their common prior 
conviction on the superiority of the Spanish Armada.
In conclusion, even though new facts were revealed today that may appear to be 
decidedly conclusive on favor of one side or other, probably nothing would change that 
first experience which has been handed down to us. It was the very unexpected nature of 
the outcome both for England and Spain, that led to the immediate construction of the 
myth of the English victory and the Spanish defeat, in which each side believed 
wholeheartedly for centuries.
33 
 
34 
 
 6
Conclusion
The Armada Campaign has been discussed differently throughout history. At the 
very beginning, just when the event took place, people’s conception was that there had 
been an English victory and therefore a Spanish defeat. In the aftermath, it has been 
believed that the English country saw their power increased and the Spanish one was 
deteriorated. There were also some publications on this idea, such as William 
Camden’s, but they were just narrations of the events commissioned normally by 
English people, such as Queen Elizabeth; it was not until the end of the nineteenth 
century, coinciding with the third centenary, that writers started to focused not only on 
the narrations, but also in the English and Spanish tactics. It was also in that century 
when the commemoration of the English victory did not only take place in books but 
also in poetry, performances, and other type of publications and public acts. 
In 1988, the fourth centenary of the Armada Campaign, ideas changed. Both 
English and Spanish people agreed for the first time on a single version, which was not 
the one prevailing until then. Historians such as Fernández-Armesto and Robert 
Hutchinson claimed that, in the 1588 naval engagement, both countries were defeated. 
They suggested that it had been a material and moral downfall. Moreover, the idea that 
England saw its power increased is rejected by García Cortázar in Los mitos de la 
Historia en España. He established that the Spanish power did not start to decrease until 
1623 and that England did not see its power increased until the eighteenth century with 
Queen Victoria. Nevertheless, the question stated in the first chapter should be answered 
now: are these ideas appearing in the fourth centenary onwards present in the texts 
written immediately after the Armada Campaign took place? 
Ubaldino’s and Ribadeneyra’s works, both written within a year of the events, 
provide an answer to this question. On the one hand, the way Ubaldino narrated the 
story leads to the idea that there was an English victory over the Armada, which 
according to him every time they fought each other run away. Thus, the idea of an 
English triumph had been transmitted already in the first English accounts on the event. 
On the other hand, the Spanish version is different, as it is the version of those who 
were defeated; this is the idea that Ribadeneyra proposes. In his letters, Ribadeneyra 
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focused on the arguments for carrying out the just and necessary invasion of England 
and on the causes for the fall of the Armada. In his work, Ribadeneyra is constantly 
inflicting guilt over not only the enemy, but also over his own country. He utterly 
blames Spanish people for the reasons of not getting the victory; but as such, they can 
be solved. Thus, it is important to notice that Ribadeneyra does not talk about defeat, 
but about fall. Moreover, the Armada’s fall is something momentary; it is a postponed 
victory because God is testing Spanish faith. It can be inferred that Ribadeneyra thinks 
that God will provide the victory when Spain solves all its problems causing the fall. 
After having considered all these previous ideas, I can assert that the idea 
conceived during the fourth centenary about the fact that both countries were defeated,
is not present in these early texts. While Ubaldino claims that it was an English victory 
and a Spanish defeat, Ribadeneyra suggests that there has been an English victory, but 
not a Spanish defeat. The experience of a common defeat is only revealed when 
confronting them with further evidence. It may be concluded that such myths of the 
English victory over the Armada could crystallise as early as then due to the absolute 
unexpectedness of the outcome of the conflict. 
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